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ABSTRACT
Garcetti v. Ceballos was intended to clear up an area of First Amendment law so murky that it was the
source not only of circuit splits but also of intra-circuit splits—panels from within the same circuit had
arrived at opposite results in nearly identical cases. As it turned out, the Supreme Court itself was as
splintered as the circuits. Of all the previously argued cases that remained undecided during the Court’s
transition involving Justice O’Connor’s retirement and Justice Alito’s confirmation, Garcetti was the only
one for which the Court ordered a second argument. This suggested to some that without a ninth vote the
Court was deadlocked or even split three ways. After reargument, the Court held, in a 5-4 opinion with two
dissents, that speech made “pursuant to an employee’s official duties” is not citizen speech for First
Amendment purposes.
Garcetti was a long-overdue effort to address a decades-old ambiguity in the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence. In 1968, the Court had established the Pickering balancing test to weigh the competing
interests of government employer and government employee in First Amendment retaliation claims. Then
in Connick, it created a threshold question for such claims: only speech made “as a citizen on matters of
public concern” could proceed to analysis under Pickering. One issue had remained unclear after Connick:
Is there ever a time when an employee speaks “as a citizen on matters of public concern” in the course of
doing her job?
That is exactly what Richard Ceballos said he was doing when he wrote an internal memo to his
superiors in the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office critical of a questionable affidavit used to obtain a
search warrant; he claimed they later retaliated against him. The Supreme Court found that because the
memo was prepared as part of Ceballos’s duties, it was not citizen speech and thus was not protected.
This Article analyzes how published district and appellate court decisions issued in the months
immediately following Garcetti illustrate that certain First Amendment retaliation claims are now
foreclosed. What is perhaps surprising, however, is the type and number of claims that are surviving
Garcetti. Circuits had often referred to the approach chosen by the Court as a per se rule, but Garcetti is a
per se rule with an Achilles’ heel—a refusal to say how “official duties” are to be defined—that gives
plaintiffs unexpected leverage to resist dismissal and summary judgment.
This Article analyzes how courts have interpreted the “pursuant to the employee’s official duties”
requirement and on what grounds Garcetti has been distinguished. It offers examples that call into question
the assertion that First Amendment protection is inappropriate and unnecessary because other protections
are available. Having concluded that current whistleblower statutes have significant gaps and that going
public with negative information would likely only mean the employee who suffers retaliation wins the
battle (the Connick/Garcetti test) and loses the war (the Pickering balancing test), the Article ends by
arguing for the approach found in the Garcetti minority opinion advocating an “adjustment” of Pickering
that would take into account the public’s interest in protection of the speech in question regardless of the
capacity in which the speaker made the statements.
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Tough Talk from the Supreme Court on Free Speech:
The Illusory Per Se Rule in Garcetti As Further Evidence of Connick’s
Unworkable Employee/Citizen Speech Partition
Sonya Bice
“Everything is vague to a degree you do not realize till you have tried to make it precise . . . .
When you pass from the vague to the precise . . . you always run a certain risk of error.”
- Bertrand Russell1

INTRODUCTION
The line the Supreme Court drew in Connick v. Myers2 between speech made
“as a citizen upon matters of public concern” (constitutionally protected when it
outweighs employer interests) and speech made “as an employee upon matters
only of personal interest” (not) has proved tricky to apply. That has been
especially true in cases of so-called “whistleblowers”—those who “seek to bring
to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust.”3 One of the big
questions Connick left unanswered4 was whether an employee’s job-related
speech (as opposed to speech on a public issue unrelated to her job) ever qualifies
as “speech made as a citizen on matters of public concern”—the threshold
inquiry—and thereby proceeds to the balancing test devised in Pickering v.
Board of Education.5 Prior to Garcetti v. Ceballos,6 federal courts applying

1
BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOGICAL ATOMISM 38 (Open Court Publishing
Company, 1985) (1918).
2
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144 (1983).
3
Id.
4
At least partly unanswered. Connick cannot properly be reconciled with an absolute per se rule
eliminating protection of speech made at work to other coworkers about the terms of working
conditions because the Court did undertake a balancing test for one of the statements in question—
a statement made at work to other co-workers about alleged pressures to work on political
campaigns. (“Because one of the questions in Myers’s survey touched upon a matter of public
concern . . . we must determine whether Connick was justified in discharging Myers.” Id. at 149.)
An interesting question is thus raised as to whether Garcetti would block Myers from reaching the
balancing test that she reached under the Connick test. If so, does the recent ruling overrule rather
than clarify the precedent? If not, it follows that Garcetti should be read narrowly.
5
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 567 (1968).
6
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1960 (2006).
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Connick had given different answers to this question.7 The Fourth and Fifth
Circuits said it does not; the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits said it does; and in four
other circuits, panels within a circuit had reached opposite conclusions in
apparently indistinguishable cases.8
When the Supreme Court took up the question in Garcetti, a 5-4 majority
held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment
purposes,”9 and thus lose constitutional protection for that speech.
A New York City cop who had been given responsibility for safety issues in
the precinct alerted officials to employees’ chronic health problems and the
potential link to leaking gasoline storage tanks. Almost immediately after he
revealed the embarrassing problem, he was stripped of duties, reassigned
multiple times and disciplined for minor infractions. His First Amendment
retaliation claim, which had survived summary judgment motions under the
Pickering/Connick test and had been in litigation for three years, was one of
Garcetti’s first casualties.10 The district court found that his case fell squarely
within the type of First Amendment claim categorically excluded from protection
under Garcetti’s added rule—that whistleblower claims cannot be brought by
employees for whom reporting problems was part of the job.11

7

Legal scholars have criticized the Connick framework as turning on an unnecessarily arbitrary
distinction between “employee speech” and “citizen speech.” See, e.g., Randy J. Kozel,
Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007 (2005) (calling current free
speech doctrine “fundamentally flawed” and advocating full protection for “external” speech and
no protection for “internal” speech with four specific exceptions); Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible
Content Discrimination Under the First Amendment: The Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 529 (1998) (arguing that a better test would require an employer to show
“an interest unrelated to suppressing an employee’s beliefs about management” modeled on United
States v. O’Brien); Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on
Matters of Public Concern, 64 Ind. L. J. 43 (1988) (advocating a “return to Pickering” without the
narrowing effects of Connick, and allowing any speech that addresses a matter of public concern to
be subject to the balancing test); and Toni Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the
Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 68 (1987) (advocating protection of all speech, on
both private and public matters, unless “any government interests exist that might justify restriction
of the speech”).
8
See infra pp. 6-8.
9
Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1960.
10
Ruotolo v. City of New York, No. 03 Civ. 5045(SHS), 2006 WL 2033662 (S.D.N.Y. July 19,
2006).
11
Id. at *3.
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Outside of that relatively limited subset are employees who face retaliation
for speaking out about job-related problems when it is not so explicitly their jobs
to do so, such as Keith Hill, a borough manager who claimed constructive
termination after he opposed some of the policies and projects of the mayor.12 In
considering cases in this second group of First Amendment retaliation claims in
just the first few months following Garcetti, lower courts have already diverged
on interpreting the Supreme Court’s “pursuant to official duties” requirement.
Courts that take to heart the Supreme Court’s words about “a proper inquiry” into
whether a task is “within the scope of the employee’s professional duties for First
Amendment purposes”13 have made clear with surprising swiftness: Garcetti will
not turn out to be quite the per se rule it was hailed (and decried) to be.
Based on an analysis of published opinions handed down in the months
immediately following Garcetti, this Article contends that despite the apparently
categorical nature of the holding, its “per se” standard has proved to be
unexpectedly elastic in application. The Court’s implied directive to lower courts
to conduct a “proper inquiry” into whether the speech in question is part of the
duties the employee “actually is expected to perform” opens the door for lower
courts to evade Garcetti or at least mitigate its potential harshness.
Part I starts with a brief explanation of the development of the jurisprudence
on public employees’ First Amendment rights. It goes on to describe the circuit
and intra-circuit splits that led to Garcetti and to discuss the rationale of the
Supreme Court’s ruling as well as the three dissents. Part II analyzes how the
district and appellate courts that handed down opinions immediately following
Garcetti interpreted the “pursuant to the employee’s official duties” requirement
and on what grounds Garcetti was distinguished. Assuming Garcetti now
forecloses First Amendment protection for certain public employee speech, Part
III discusses the viability of statutory protection for government employees who
face retaliation for exposing misconduct and whether their “safest avenue of
expression”14 is to forego internal reporting procedures and take the information
public. Having concluded that current whistleblower statutes have significant
gaps and that the option of going public with negative information would likely
only mean that the employee wins the battle (the Connick/Garcetti test) and loses
the war (the Pickering test), the Article ends by arguing that a better approach to
12

Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, No. 05-1356, 2006 WL 2061145 (3d Cir. July 26, 2006).
Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1962.
14
The words are from the majority opinion: “Giving employees an internal forum for their speech
will discourage them from concluding that the safest avenue of expression is to state their views in
public.” Id. at 1961.
13
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determining what speech is protected and what is not is found in the Garcetti
minority’s advocacy of Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District15 (a
unanimous decision written by then-Justice Rehnquist)16 as the controlling
precedent and of an “adjustment” of Pickering that would take into account the
public’s interest in protection of the speech in question regardless of the capacity
in which the speaker made the statements.
I. Public Employees’ First Amendment Rights, from McAuliffe to Garcetti
A. Protected Speech for Public Employees: The Road from “Never” to
“Sometimes”
When a Massachusetts constable was fired in 1892 for breaking a department
rule that prohibited political activity, he failed to persuade the Massachusetts
Supreme Court that there was anything constitutionally objectionable about the
rule.17 In a two-page decision dismissing the case, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., a state jurist not yet appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, stated as a
self-evident fact that “there is nothing in the constitution or the statute to prevent
the city from attaching obedience to this rule as a condition to the office of
policeman,”18 and he added a statement that would not be successfully
challenged for decades: “The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”19
Like many well-crafted sound bites, Holmes’s statement had the ring of truth
and the benefit of being memorable while disguising logical fallacies and failing
to address certain inconvenient facts—which included, in this instance, the fact
that the employer was the government. This leave-your-rights-at-the-door
approach generally prevailed at the U.S. Supreme Court from 1882 to 1952,20
perhaps not coincidentally, since Holmes’s tenure on the Court spanned most of
that period.21

15

Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1963 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
17
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (1892) (Mass.).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144 (1983) (“For many years, Holmes’ epigram expressed this
Court’s law”).
21
Holmes himself authored at least one of the Court’s public employee free speech rulings that was
consistent with McAuliffe: U.S. v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930). Holmes’s tenure on the
Supreme Court lasted from 1902 to 1932. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES:
16
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When Marvin Pickering, a public school teacher who had been fired over a
letter he wrote and sent to a newspaper on the issue of a local bond referendum,
appealed a state high court decision that essentially tracked Holmes’s reasoning
from 75 years earlier, 22 the Court reversed, saying,
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court’s
opinion may be read to suggest that teachers
may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish
the First Amendment rights they would
otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on
matters of public interest in connection with the
operation of the public schools in which they
work, it proceeds on a premise that has been
unequivocally rejected in numerous prior
decisions of this Court.23
The Court was referring to a string of cases in which it had struck down
loyalty oaths and various mechanisms designed to deny employment to anyone
who would not disclose and renounce Communist and “anti-government”
associations.24 These cases culminated in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,25 which
overturned a law requiring state university faculty members to sign, among other
things, anti-Communist Party statements. It was Keyishian the Pickering Court
quoted when it said, “[t]he theory that public employment which may be denied
altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable,
has been uniformly rejected.”26
The Court then fashioned a balancing test, in place nearly four decades later,
that requires an employee to show that the speech in question was made as a
citizen on matters of public concern and that the employee’s interest in free

SELECTIONS FROM THE SPEECHES, LETTERS, JUDICIAL OPINIONS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR. xi-xiv (Richard Posner ed. 1992).
22
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 567 (1968) (“Pickering’s claim that his letter was
protected by the First Amendment was rejected [by the Illinois courts] on the ground that his
acceptance of a teaching position in the public schools obliged him to refrain from making
statements about the operation of the schools ‘which in the absence of such position he would have
an undoubted right to engage in.’”).
23
Id. at 568.
24
Id.
25
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
26
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605-606).
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expression outweighs “the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”27
In Connick v. Myers, in 1983, the Court addressed the claim of Sheila Myers,
a district attorney fired after circulating a survey critical of management to fellow
employees following a personnel decision to which she objected.28 Connick was
the first case to “require[] a separate examination of the speech involved to
determine whether the Pickering balancing test was to be applied.”29 Connick
thus “made it more difficult for an employee to invoke the Pickering/Mount
Healthy standard by holding that a threshold inquiry must be made to classify the
speech as a matter of public concern.”30
B. Circuit and Intra-Circuit Splits over the Definition of “Citizen
Speech”
In trying to apply Connick’s distinction between speech made as a citizen
and speech made as an employee, lower courts ran squarely into the question of
whether there is ever a time when an employee speaks as a citizen in the course
of doing her job. Analyzing more than 300 post-Connick cases addressing the
question of what constituted speaking “on a matter of public concern,” Professor
Steven Allred found in 1988 that
[L]ower federal courts have been anything but
consistent in their determination of what speech
is protected under Connick v. Myers. Although
broad categories of cases can be identified, there
exist contradictions within every category,
leaving public employees and employers

27

Id. at 568.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 138 (1983).
29
Steven Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public
Concern, 64 IND. L. J. 43 (1988) (categorizing and analyzing lower court rulings in representative
cases in which speech was about 1) matters of current community debate, 2) allegations of
malfeasance or abuse of office, 3) public safety and welfare, 4) quality of public education, 5)
discrimination, and 6) purely personal interest).
30
Id. at 49, referencing Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
(where employer would have reached the same decision for reasons besides the protected speech of
the employee, protected speech that played some part in the employer’s decision does not shield
employee from adverse employment decisions).
28
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confused as to the scope of their free speech
rights and responsibilities.31
Part of the reason for the confusion, Professor Toni Massaro argues, is that
“defining a ‘public concern’ is subjective.”32
The Ninth Circuit’s Ceballos v. Garcetti ruling, which found that speech
made within the scope of an employee’s duties can sometimes be citizen speech
on matters of public interest worthy of First Amendment protection, described
“nearly unanimous opposition” to a per se rule33 and noted that “the weight of
authority in other circuits accords with our precedents.”34 It noted the sole
exception of the Fourth Circuit, which “seems to be moving toward a [per se]
rule.”35
In the appeal of that decision to the Supreme Court, of course, matters were
characterized differently.36 The petition for writ of certiorari described a “major
inter-circuit conflict,”37 with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits finding that speech
made in the course of employment could in some circumstances qualify as
speech made as a citizen on matters of public concern and therefore be
constitutionally protected,38 and the Fourth and Fifth Circuits adopting an
approach that focused on whether the speech was made in the speaker’s role as a
citizen or her role as an employee (and if the latter, finding it automatically
unprotected).39 Perhaps more interestingly, in the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and
Tenth Circuits, different panels in the same circuit were applying Connick to
31

Id. at 75.
Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1987).
33
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d by 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006).
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Pet. for Writ of Cert. to the U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the 9th Cir., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct.
1951 (2006) (No. 04-473).
37
Id. at 14.
38
Id. (citing Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1292 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding
constitutionally protected a request from police officers to supervisor for permission to alert district
attorney to others’ improper review of records)).
39
Id. at 15 (citing Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding no First
Amendment violations where a law banned state university faculty from accessing porn sites on
publicly owned computers on the grounds that the regulation was of “speech clearly made in the
employee’s role as employee”) and Gillum v. City of Kerrville, 3 F.3d 117, 120-21 (5th Cir. 1993)
(finding no First Amendment protection for police officer who claimed retaliation after he had
reported misconduct of chief to internal affairs department)).
32
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markedly similar fact patterns and coming to different conclusions about whether
speech was protected.40
For example, the Seventh Circuit found no constitutional protection for
speech made as part of Gerardo Gonzales’s work as a civilian doing
investigations of police misconduct.41 Gonzales had alleged that after joining the
police department, he himself was harassed and ultimately terminated by
supervisors hostile to him based on earlier investigations of other police
officers.42 The court found that Gonzales “was clearly acting entirely in an
employment capacity when he made those reports.”43
A different panel of Seventh Circuit judges came to a different conclusion in
Jones v. Delgado,44 where a police officer whose job involved narcotics
investigations suffered retaliation after disclosing allegations of drug activity by a
person connected to the police chief.45 Because “Delgado's investigation here
was not a routine discharge of an assigned duty,” his First Amendment retaliation
claim survived summary judgment.46

40

Id. at 17. See also Tony Coppola, Content, Form and Context—The Eighth Circuit Misapplies
the Connick Test in Examining the First Amendment Rights of a Public Employee in Buazard v.
Meridith, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 417, 431-446 (2000) (discussing cases that illustrate the variety of
approaches circuits were taking in interpreting Connick) and Marni M. Zack, Public Employee Free
Speech: The Policy Reasons for Rejecting a Per Se Rule Precluding Speech Rights, 46 B.C. L. Rev.
893 (2005).
41
Gonzales v. City of Chicago, 239 F.3d 939, 940 (7th Cir. 2001).
42
Id. at 940.
43
Id. at 941.
44
Delgado v. Jones, 95 Fed. Appx. 185 (7th Cir. Apr. 1, 2004).
45
News accounts identified the person as the husband of a Milwaukee alderwoman who was a
friend of the chief. (Gina Barton, “Other Suits from Jones Era Pending,” Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel, March 30, 2005, at B1. At http://www.jsonline.com/story/?id=313860.) In an earlier
decision, the court had alluded to the reputation of the chief within the department for being quick
to retaliate with unwanted transfers (in violation of Department rules); the court quoted the
appellee’s brief: “Delgado then showed the letter to his supervising lieutenant, who commented:
‘What district do you want to be transferred to?’” Delgado was in fact transferred the day the chief
learned of Delgado’s disclosure. Delgado, 282 F.3d at 514.
46
The court found Delgado’s speech protected because he was outside his area of responsibility
(routine narcotics investigations) and into internal affairs when he recommended an outside
investigation of the allegations. It is unclear how the outside investigation Delgado recommended
could be characterized as an “internal affairs” investigation when there was no allegation that any
police officer was involved in the drug activity, and no cover-up or unlawful retaliation had
occurred at the time Delgado disclosed the information.
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C. Garcetti v. Ceballos
1. Background
In 2000, a defense attorney filed a motion challenging a search warrant and
asked Richard Ceballos, a calendar deputy47 in the Los Angeles County District
Attorney’s office, to investigate what the defense attorney considered to be
“inaccuracies in an affidavit” that was the basis for granting the warrant.48 The
request was not an unusual one.49 When Ceballos, at the time an 11-year veteran
of the office who had been promoted and supervised other attorneys, reviewed
the affidavit, he was convinced that misrepresentations had been made to obtain
the warrant.50 After a conversation with the deputy sheriff who had signed the
affidavit, Ceballos wrote a memo detailing his reservations about the validity of
the warrant and recommending that the case be dismissed, which his supervisor
considered but ultimately decided against.51 With the knowledge of his
supervisor, Ceballos turned over his memo, with his own opinions redacted, to
the defense, on the assumption that he was obligated to do so under a leading
case about prosecutors’ disclosure obligations.52 When the hearing on the warrant
was held, Ceballos testified for the defense.53 The appellate court pointed out that
at the search warrant hearing, the court “sustained the prosecution’s objections to
several questions defense counsel asked [Ceballos,]” which left him unable to tell
the reasons for his conclusions about the warrant.54 The judge upheld the validity
of the warrant, saying that probable cause for the warrant was shown by other
facts anyway and the disputed statements were irrelevant to the judge’s
conclusion.55
In the months following the hearing, Ceballos was demoted, stripped of his
only homicide case, denied a promotion, and transferred to a branch that would
47

Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1955 (describing a calendar deputy’s job as “exercis[ing] certain
supervisory responsibilities over other lawyers” and, at the request of defense attorneys,
“investigat[ing] aspects of pending cases”).
48
Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1955.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1956. There appears to have been some initial agreement that the warrant was flawed prior
to the hearing on the motion to traverse.
52
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring the disclosure by prosecutors of exculpatory
evidence).
53
Garcetti 126 S.Ct. at 1972.
54
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d by 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006).
55
Garcetti 126 S.Ct. at 1972.

BICE, TOUGH TALK

10

mean a longer commute.56 Never, however, did any of his supervisors openly
reprimand him, put anything into his personnel file, or even make any argument
that his actions had been reckless or inappropriate; the county contended that
none of its actions were adverse employment actions, and none were taken in
response to the conflict over the search warrant affidavit.57 It contended,
however, that Ceballos’s supervisor could have done so because the speech in
question—the memo, which Ceballos acknowledged was prepared “pursuant to
his duties as a prosecutor”58—was not protected.59
Ceballos pursued an employee grievance over the alleged retaliation, but no
retaliation was found and his claim was denied.60
2. Ceballos v. Garcetti in the District and Appellate Courts
Ceballos filed a First Amendment retaliation lawsuit in federal court and,
after losing a summary judgment motion, appealed to the Ninth Circuit.61 The
Ninth Circuit reversed, citing circuit precedent that rejected a per se application
of Connick62 and noting, “a per se rule stripping all First Amendment protection
from speech uttered in the performance of routine, as opposed to non-routine, job
functions would be inconsistent with the very nature of the Connick test which
contains a second step that requires us to balance various factors . . . .”63 Judge
O’Scannlain concurred that precedent dictated the majority’s decision but argued
that such precedents were wrong and should be overruled.64 He ridiculed the
majority’s “seductively simple” argument that whistleblowing speech should be
covered by the First Amendment because such speech is important and, in a tone
dripping with sarcasm, wrote:

56
Id. at 1956 and 1974 at n.13; the appellate court ruling mentions that retaliatory transfers are
known in the DA’s office as “Freeway Therapy” (Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1171, n.2).
57
Tr. of Oral Argument at 15, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006), Oct. 12, 2005
(Petitioner’s counsel: “[I]t is not our position, and we have never taken the stance, that the deputy
district attorney in this case was reckless in regards of his speech [interruption] or his evaluation”).
58
Garcetti, 126 S.Ct. at 1960, quoting Resp’t Br. at 4.
59
Tr. of Oral Argument at 15. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006), Oct. 12, 2005 (“[I]t is
our view that the supervisor–while the supervisor contended that he did not react to this speech
adversely, that he could have.”).
60
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1956.
61
Ceballos, 361 F.3d 1168.
62
Roth v. Veteran’s Admin. of United States, 856 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1988).
63
Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1176.
64
Garcetti, 361 F.3d at 1194 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
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How strange it must now be for the hundreds, if
not thousands, of legislators throughout this
country who have voted to enact or retain
[whistleblowing] laws now to discover that their
votes were essentially meaningless—that the
First Amendment already provided public
employees with protections co-extensive with,
and in many respects even greater than those
purportedly conferred by, the legislation they
crafted and helped shepherd through their state
legislative processes.65
3. The Supreme Court Takes the Case
The question before the Supreme Court when it granted certiorari concerned
only the status of the speech in the disposition memo; the instances of Ceballos’s
other speech—his comments to the bar association (which in any event occurred
after the employment actions), his conversation with his supervisors about the
case, and his testimony at the hearing on the motion to traverse—were not
addressed.66
The case proceeded on a schedule that coincided with critical turnover on the
Court. Oral arguments were first heard October 12, 2005, and the case was
scheduled for reargument March 21, 2006, following Justice O’Connor’s
retirement and the confirmation of her replacement, Justice Alito.67 The decision
to schedule a reargument was seen by some as an indication that the court was
evenly split without Justice O’Connor’s vote.68 The ruling was handed down
65

Id. at 1192 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
The Ninth Circuit opinion stated, “[W]e hold that, for purposes of summary judgment, Ceballos’s
allegations of wrongdoing in the memorandum constitute protected speech under the First
Amendment; accordingly, we need not determine here whether similar protection should be
afforded to his other communications. Those matters are best explored at trial.” Ceballos, 361 F.3d
1168, 1173.
67
David L. Hudson, Jr., “The Return of the Reargument: Supreme Court to Hear Again a Key
Employee
Free
Speech
Case,”
ABA
Journal
eReport,
March
17,
2006.
http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/m17employ.html.
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Id. (quoting Georgetown University law professor Martin Lederman as saying, "It is likely that
Garcetti is the only one of the 20 outstanding cases in which Justice O’Connor’s vote was
determinative—in other words, in which the court is divided 4-4 without her vote.") New York
Times reporter Linda Greenhouse wrote that “[t]he reality may have been more complex,” citing
Justice Breyer’s separate dissent and suggesting that his vote “may have been uncertain until late in
the process.” Linda Greenhouse, Some Whistle-Blowers Lose Free-Speech Protections, N. Y.
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May 30, 2006, the majority opinion written by Justice Anthony Kennedy and
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.69
The Court reversed the finding of First Amendment protection for the memo
written to recommend dismissing the disputed criminal case and remanded for
the appellate court to take up Ceballos’s remaining claims.
The majority held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to
their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First
Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.”70 It focused on the relationship of
the speech in question to the speaker’s responsibilities as an employee:
The controlling factor in Ceballos’s case is that
his expressions were made pursuant to his duties
as a calendar deputy. . . . That consideration—
the fact that Ceballos spoke as a prosecutor
fulfilling a responsibility to advise his supervisor
about how best to proceed with a pending
case—distinguishes Ceballos’s case from those
in which the First Amendment provides
protection against discipline.71
The majority also dwells at length on the needs of government as an
employer and the havoc it says would ensue if speech such as Ceballos’s were
constitutionally protected. To object, as the appellate court had,72 that it is a
doctrinal anomaly to leave unprotected the same speech made in the context of
the workplace that is protected when made in a public forum “misconceives the
theoretical underpinnings of [the Court’s] decisions,” the majority sniffed.
The opinion’s last paragraphs, however, reveal Garcetti’s Achilles’ heel:
“We have no occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the
scope of an employee’s duties in cases where there is room for serious debate.”73
Beyond noting that a written job description is “neither necessary nor sufficient”
and differentiating between formal job descriptions and the duties an employee
TIMES, May 31, 2006, at A16.
69
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1954.
70
Id. at 1960.
71
Id. at 1959-60.
72
The same objection was raised in Justice Stevens’s dissent, id. at 1963.
73
Id. at 1961.

BICE, TOUGH TALK

13

“actually is expected to perform,”74 the Court gave little guidance for resolving
what will likely be a highly litigated question.75
It was accompanied by a dissent written by Justice Souter (joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Stevens), as well as dissents by Justices Stevens and Breyer.76
Justice Souter’s dissent recognized the “tension between individual and public
interests”77 but advocated for something that could be dubbed a “Pickering plus”
analysis:
“[T]he risks to the government are great enough
for us to hold from the outset that an employee
commenting on subjects in the course of duties
should not prevail on balance unless he speaks
on a matter of unusual importance and satisfies
high standards of responsibility in the way he
does it. . . . [I]t is fair to say that only comment
on
official
dishonesty,
deliberately
unconstitutional
action,
other
serious
wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety can
weigh out in an employee’s favor.”78
Justice Stevens’s dissent considered the controlling precedent to be Givhan v.
Western Line Consolidated School District, which he noted was a unanimous
opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist.79 In Givhan, a conversation a teacher
had with a principal concerning the administration’s racism was found to be
protected speech.80 “Our silence as to whether or not her speech was made
pursuant to her job duties demonstrates that the point was immaterial,” Stevens
74

Id. at 1962.
Kathleen Sullivan, professor and former dean of Stanford Law School, once observed: “Rule
choices are suspicious, and in the end rules never hold. Turn the page and you’ll find the codifier
scrambling for an exception. This is because general propositions cannot decide concrete cases . . .
.” Kathleen Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992)
(identifying the “key fault lines along which the Reagan and Bush appointees fractured” during the
previous term as “a split over the choice of rules or standards”).
76
Id. at 1963. With a Court highly divided on this question, it is conceivable that if the Court were
to revisit the issue in the near future, a case with an only slightly different set of facts might well
come out a different way.
77
Id. at 1965.
78
Id. at 1967.
79
Id. at 1963.
80
Id., citing Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
75
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wrote. “That is equally true today, for it is senseless to let constitutional
protection for exactly the same words hinge on whether they fall within a job
description.”81
Justice Breyer found the majority’s rule “too absolute” and Justice Souter’s
proffered standard no real improvement over Pickering because it was still too
broad and ultimately saved courts no time.82 He argued that constitutional
protection was not precluded when a government employee speaks about matters
of public concern “in the course of ordinary job-related duties”83 and said
Pickering is the appropriate analysis in such a case.
II.

The Early Returns: How Courts Are Applying Garcetti’s So-Called
“Per Se Rule”

Much of the debate about the issues raised in Garcetti has been framed in
terms of whether Pickering and Connick are properly read to require a so-called
“per se rule”—that speech made “as an employee” is per se excluded from First
Amendment protection. Disparaging reference is made to a “per se rule” seven
times in the Ninth Circuit’s decision on Ceballos’s case, and the dissent quotes a
Tenth Circuit decision using the phrase.84 Though the phrase is nowhere to be
found in the Supreme Court opinion or in any of the dissents, the term has been
widely used as shorthand for the concept that speech made in the course of
employment is automatically unprotected for purposes of Pickering analysis.85
The term “per se,” defined as “standing alone, without reference to additional
facts,”86 seems ill-suited for describing the Garcetti rule. As the Court’s decision
indicated, courts still need to make a “proper inquiry” into the question of what
the employee is “actually expected to do.”87 While the new test adds a twist to
the Connick analysis, it is unclear whether it does more than create more
deference in the employer’s favor—as a thumb on the scale of the Pickering
balancing test. As Ceballos’s counsel pointed out in oral argument, “[A]ll this per
se rule does is add complexity and the need for greater factual development. It’s
81

Id. at 1963.
Id. at 1974-1975.
83
Id. at 1976.
84
E.g., “The proposed per se rule would be particularly detrimental to whistleblowers . . . .”
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1176 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d by 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006).
85
E.g., Marni Zack, Public Employee Free Speech: The Policy Reasons for Rejecting a Per Se Rule
Precluding Speech Rights, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 893 (2005).
86
Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
87
Garcetti, 126 S. Ct. at 1961.
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not the magic bullet that the Petitioners seem to think it is.”88 Yale Law School
professor Jack Balkin89 stated, following Garcetti, “I am sympathetic to the
Court's desire to reduce the burden of ad hoc balancing by creating a bright line
rule of no protection. But in this case, the Court's decision doesn't really create a
bright line rule, because the boundaries of what is within an employee's job
description may turn out to be quite contestable, and will be contested in future
cases.”90
In this way, Garcetti resembles Connick and other tests designed to block
disfavored types of cases. Analogous developments can be found in
administrative law in the application of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.91 As Professor Cass Sunstein has observed, a seemingly
straightforward test can get bogged down in the threshold inquiry: does the test
even apply in this case?
Chevron famously creates a two-step inquiry for
courts to follow in reviewing agency
interpretations. . . . It is an understatement to say
that a great deal of judicial and academic
attention has been paid to the foundations and
meaning of Chevron’s two-step inquiry. But in
the last period, the most important and confusing
questions have involved neither step. Instead
they involve Chevron Step Zero—the initial
inquiry into whether the Chevron framework
applies at all.92
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions attempting to clarify the Chevron test
reflected, Sunstein said, “an intense and longstanding disagreement . . . involving
a classic rules-standards debate [that] echoes throughout the law.”93 Such echoes
can be heard in the rulings and dissents of First Amendment cases following
Pickering, including Garcetti.
88

Tr. of Oral Argument at 44. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951 (2006) (March 21, 2006).
Jack Balkin is Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment at Yale Law
School. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/index.htm.
90
Jack Balkin, “Ceballos—The Court creates bad information policy.” May 30, 2006.
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/05/ceballos-court-creates-bad-information.html.
91
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
92
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006).
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Id.
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There is a subset of cases that survives summary judgment under
Pickering/Connick but fails to survive under Garcetti,94 but the number of postGarcetti decisions that have focused on the opinion’s requirement of a factintensive inquiry shows it would be naïve to expect the decision to curb litigation
of First Amendment claims.95
A. Appellate Courts
Garcetti has been cited to affirm cases in which the plaintiff appealed after
having lost under the Pickering test in the court below. (One can also envision
cases that survive summary judgment under Garcetti and Pickering in district
court being reversed on appeal.) But the dismissal of at least one case that had
failed Pickering in the lower court was reversed under a somewhat
counterintuitive reading of Garcetti.
During June and July 2006, the Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits issued
rulings96 that cited Garcetti in affirming lower courts’ summary judgment
rulings. These rulings were hardly surprising; plaintiffs who had lost the Connick
and Pickering analyses would not be expected to prevail under an even narrower
test.
The Third Circuit, however, reversed a dismissal of a First Amendment claim
by a borough manager alleging retaliation by the mayor,97 saying that it was
94

For cases that fail Pickering/Connick tests on the grounds that the employee’s interest in the
protected free speech are outweighed by the employer’s interests, the Garcetti rule obviously
makes no difference.
95
Another possible explanation for the lower courts’ hesitation to use Garcetti to dismiss what they
may see as close cases is suggested by an argument made by Professor Dan Kahan of Yale Law
School in the context of legislation and social change. Kahan’s thesis is that “[a]s severity of
condemnation . . . increases, the percentage of decisionmakers who are willing to enforce the law
declines.” He suggests that corrective actions that are perceived as overly harsh are ultimately
counter-productive. As applied in the context of Supreme Court precedents, his theory would
suggest that lower courts that perceive a Supreme Court rule as resulting in injustice in individual
cases would seek ways to distinguish them. Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving
the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000).
96
Mills v. City of Evansville, No. 05-3207, 2006 U.S. App. Lexis 15082 (7th Cir. June 20, 2006)
(affirming dismissal where police officer was transferred after expressing opposition to changes in
department policy); Bailey v. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 451 F.3d 514 (8th Cir.
2006) (affirming dismissal of claim by consultant who objected to the handling of state disability
benefits claims); Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore County Bd. of Educ., No. 05-16561, 2006 Lexis U.S.
App. 16167 (11th Cir. June 26, 2006) (affirming dismissal of claim by high school junior varsity
cheerleader sponsor who alleged retaliatory non-renewal of contract after she raised concerns to
principal about the fairness of cheerleading tryouts).
97
Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, No. 05-1356, 2006 WL 2061145 (3rd Cir. July 26, 2006).
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premature for the district court to determine as a matter of law that some of the
speech was not protected: “[The employee’s] First Amendment claim, insofar as
it is premised on [his] advocacy and support for ideas, principles and projects
[the mayor] disfavored, should not have been dismissed at this stage of the
proceeding.”98 The Circuit upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim as to reports of the supervisor’s harassing behavior the
employee had made to the Borough Council on the grounds that the plaintiff’s
own brief had said that he “as part of his duties as Manager and otherwise duly
reported them,”99 which killed the claim under Garcetti. That the speech related
to carrying out the projects of the borough, such as a telecommunications project,
is not ruled out as protected speech, and speech made to the borough council
about an elected official is ruled out as protected speech is, to say the least,
counterintuitive. It illustrates, however, that lower courts are going about
defining “pursuant to duties” as less of a per se rule than the Garcetti Court
seemed to intend.
B. District Courts
1. Cases in Which Garcetti Ends the Analysis
Summary judgment ended some claims when Garcetti was decided
where courts found the plaintiff’s job included reporting the kind of wrongdoing
that was claimed as the basis for subsequent retaliation.
Ruotolo v. City of New York: If there is a case
that embodies equally the concerns of Garcetti’s
fans and foes, it might be the case of Angelo
Ruotolo, a Bronx cop whose First Amendment
claim, just two weeks from trial after three years
of litigation, went down in flames thanks to
Garcetti.100 In 1999, Ruotolo had, in his capacity
as Training and Safety Officer, written a report
about the department’s leaking gasoline storage
tanks and suggested a link between the resulting
on-the-job chemical exposure and health
problems of officers.101 Though he alleged that
98

Id. at *11.
Id.
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Ruotolo v. City of New York, No. 03 CIV. 5045 (SHS), 2006 WL 2033662 (S.D.N.Y. July 19,
2006).
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Id. at *1.
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the City of New York apparently viewed his
concerns as valid and worked to resolve the
problems, he soon began receiving transfers and
discipline, and, for the first time in his 20-year
career with the department, received a negative
performance review.102 Fearing the complete
loss of his pension if he were fired, he retired
voluntarily.103 His First Amendment claim of
retaliation had survived motions to dismiss and
motions for summary judgment. When Garcetti
was handed down, however, the motion to
dismiss was renewed,104 and this time the court
granted it, saying, “[s]ince Ruotolo prepared his
Report in the course of his employment duties,
his speech is exactly the type addressed in
Garcetti; i.e., employer commissioned work
over which the employer is entitled to exercise
control.”105
Donnell v. City of Cedar Rapids106: Here
Garcetti was used not to determine whether the
speech in a First Amendment claim was
protected but to arrive at a finding of qualified
immunity for a defendant in a whistleblower
case. The case involved allegations of
deliberately lax enforcement of building
codes,107 and the only evidence the court could
find of a “habit or practice” of violating free
102

Id. at *2. An earlier decision details the claims of retaliation, which allegedly included
demotions, some 140 reassignments over a nine-month period, including a transfer to the most
violent precinct in the city, and discipline for such infractions as “sitting at an unassigned desk or
using an overly-narrow margin on a typed report.” Ruotolo, 2005 WL 1253936 at *1-2. The case
also received press attention. See Helen Peterson, “140 Transfers Fuel Sgt’s $1.2M Beef vs.
NYPD,” New York Daily News, July 9, 2003.
103
Ruotolo, 2005 WL 1253936 at *1-2.
104
Id. at *1.
105
Id. at *3.
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Donnell v. City of Cedar Rapids, No. 05-CV-49LRR, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35722 (N.D. Ia.
June 1, 2006).
107
Id.
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speech rights was the defendant’s “repeated
attempts to shield preferred contractors from
[plaintiff’s] inspections and citations.”108 The
court granted summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds, citing Garcetti for the
proposition that those actions did not count as
violations because “[p]laintiff has no free speech
interest in performing the duties of his job . . .
.”109
Logan v. Indiana Department of Corrections110:
The statements of a correctional facility
healthcare administrator about “persistent
serious problems with nursing care for the
inmates”111 were found unprotected because her
job description included “evaluating the
provision of all medical services to prevent
inappropriate use or duplication.”112 It was not
found relevant that the plaintiff “had no direct
responsibility for the state’s nursing personnel
decisions.”113
It should be noted that in several cases in which the claim failed on the
grounds that the statements involved were “made pursuant to the employee’s
official duties,” that conclusion was supported by reference to the plaintiff’s own
written statements, including pleadings made in the case. One plaintiff included
in a letter to defendant the statement, “I consider any time I spend addressing this
matter with you or the agency to be services I am giving the state as a
consultant,”114 which the court cited as evidence that the statement was made “as
an employee concerned with being paid for his time.”115 Another had submitted a
report with officious and self-defeating thoroughness, noting that the report was
108

Id.
Id. at 65, n.13.
110
Logan v. Indiana Dep’t of Corrections, No. 1:04-cv-0797-SEB-JPG, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis
43631 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2006).
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Id. at *6.
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Id. at *5.
114
Bailey v. Dept. of Elementary & Secondary Education, 451 F.3d 514, 520 (8th Cir. 2006).
115
Id.
109

BICE, TOUGH TALK

20

“submitted pursuant to Interim Order 45, dated 10-19-99, wherein the Training
Sergeant is designated the Command Safety Officer on matters relating to
occupational safety”; in the subject line, he had written “Survey Pursuant to
Request”; and in the report he had explained who requested it.116 (As the court
responded in that case, “[i]t is clear beyond peradventure that the Report was
prepared as part of plaintiff’s official duties.”117) Another plaintiff’s brief stated,
“Plaintiff as part of his duties as Manager and otherwise duly reported
[harassment of employees by a supervising official] . . . .”118
The plaintiff’s choice of phrasing proved fatal to these claims. While such
statements by plaintiffs may have made for an easy post-Garcetti call, no
responsible plaintiff’s counsel should make the mistake of using such phrases in
the future.
2. The Cases Garcetti Is Not Ending
In Garcetti, the plaintiff did “not dispute that he prepared the memorandum
‘pursuant to his duties as a prosecutor.’”119 It is unlikely that future plaintiffs will
follow his lead. Where that fact is disputed, it falls to the court to decide it.
Several lower courts have refused defendants summary judgment on the
question, deciding either that the plaintiff’s circumstances were distinguishable
from Garcetti or that there were insufficient facts in evidence to make the call.
Kodrea v. City of Kokomo120: A supervisor
allegedly fired Kodrea in response to Kodrea’s
reports of an apparent kickback scheme and the
presence of an employee under his supervision
who was on the payroll but was not actually
working.121 His retaliation claim survived a
summary judgment motion because, the court
found, “[u]nlike the situation in Garcetti . . .
there is a factual dispute in this case concerning
whether Kodrea’s complaints . . . were made
pursuant to his ordinary duties. As Kodrea notes,
116

Ruotolo, 2006 WL 2033662 at *3.
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Hill, 2006 WL 2061145 at *11.
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Garcetti 126 S.Ct. at 1960.
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nothing in his job description required him to
monitor or report misconduct.”122
Day v. Borough of Carlisle123: A police officer
alleged retaliatory termination after confronting
a supervisor about the department’s failure to
investigate allegations of criminal acts by other
officers.124 The court noted that neither the
subject matter nor the place of the statements
was dispositive before concluding, “[a]lthough
the record indicates that Plaintiff had
supervisory responsibility over junior officers,
and it may be inferred that he had a duty to
report disciplinary problems to his superiors,
Plaintiff has not alleged that he was duty-bound
to report or investigate infractions by those
persons who were the subject of his
statements.”125
Batt v. City of Oakland126: A court denied
summary judgment in case involving a rookie
police officer alleging First Amendment claims
after reporting egregious criminal misconduct by
the officers who were training him.127 Making
reference to the language in Garcetti that
discusses the difference between “formal job
descriptions” and “the duties an employee
actually is expected to perform,” the court
determined that, given the evidence of a culture
to the contrary, the department’s assertions that
122

Id. at *8.
Day v. Borough of Carlisle, No. CIVA 1:CV04-1040, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 46434 (M.D. Pa.
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reporting police misconduct was an official duty
of the employee were not dispositive.128
Locklear v. Person County Board129: A principal
alleged retaliation in response to her having
voiced concerns about a new test score policy
initiated by the administration. She spoke about
her concerns in a private meeting with her
immediate supervisor and in a meeting with her
staff.130 The court dismissed other claims but
refused to dismiss the claim of First Amendment
retaliation, saying, “the record is not sufficiently
developed at this stage of the case to determine
whether Dr. Locklear’s speech was made
pursuant to her official duties.”131
Wilcoxon v. Red Clay Consolidated School
District Board of Education132: Here the court
not only denied defendant’s motion to dismiss
but added an explicit finding that a journal kept
by the plaintiff “was protected speech within the
meaning of the First Amendment.”133 The
teacher had documented a colleague’s frequent
absences in a private journal kept in his desk.134
When the document was discovered by a school
official, he faced retaliation, including
nonrenewal of his contract. The court found
Garcetti irrelevant because “[p]laintiff’s journal
containing the absences of a fellow teacher was
128

Id. at *12.
Locklear v. Person County Board of Education, No. 1:05CV00255, 2006 WL 1743460 (M.D.
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not written pursuant to his official duties as a
teacher. He was not employed to monitor the
absences of fellow teachers . . . .”135 The court
found that the information about the no-show
teacher on the public payroll was a matter of
public concern and the “personal nature” of the
plaintiff’s speech—a private journal—did not
“vitiate the status of the statement as addressing
a matter of public concern.”136
Without reading too much into early returns (the courts’ hesitation to grant
summary judgment may reflect nothing more than caution in interpreting a recent
ruling and the plaintiff-friendly standard in early stages of litigation), there is
reason to believe Garcetti is less pro-employer than it would initially appear.
Courts are interpreting Garcetti as a recognition that an employer’s word about
an employee’s official duties is not dispositive, giving plaintiffs some leverage to
resist dismissal and summary judgment.
3. Initial Confusion
Courts wishing to evade a higher court ruling rarely do so openly.137 And
it is not uncommon for it to take a while for the dust to settle after a Supreme
Court ruling. As one court noted, “I have no doubt that many courts will struggle
to define the breadth of Garcetti and its impact on First Amendment
jurisprudence.”138 It is unclear whether a desire to evade or mere confusion was
to blame where a court addressed a teacher’s claim of retaliation for having worn
a t-shirt at school drawing attention to a union contract dispute.139 The court
quoted Garcetti at some length but failed entirely to conduct the relevant
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Id. at *5.
Id. at *6 (quoting Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414-416 (1979)).
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Lower courts rarely disagree with Supreme Court holdings, at least in published opinions. One
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analysis. Instead, the court proceeded directly to the Pickering balancing test,140
appearing to read Garcetti as requiring no additional analysis but merely
restating the two sides of the balancing test.141
III.

Where Garcetti Forecloses First Amendment Protection: What Now?

Even if an unexpected number of employee First Amendment claims survive
dismissal and summary judgment motions under post-Garcetti analysis, there
remains a subset of claimants who now find no First Amendment protection
because they are explicitly charged with reporting misconduct and thus almost
any speech about wrongdoing can be seen as “pursuant to their official duties.”
The position articulated at oral arguments and in the majority opinion echoes the
reasoning of Judge O’Scannlain’s dissent from the Ninth Circuit decision:
internal whistleblower speech should be protected somehow, just never by the
First Amendment.142 At the second oral argument in Garcetti, counsel arguing as
amicus curiae for the U.S. responded to a hypothetical from Justice Souter about
a prosecutor ordered by a superior not to turn over potentially exculpatory
material as required by law: “Well, there would no doubt be other restrictions. . .
. The first amendment would not be the—would not be the source of
protection.”143 The Garcetti majority referred to “a powerful network of
legislative enactments—such as whistleblower protection laws and labor codes—
available to those who seek to expose wrongdoing.”144 There is also assurance in
the text of the Court’s decision, of “some possibility of First Amendment
protection” for external whistleblower speech.145 These claims are worth a closer
look.
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Id.
Id. at *2. Citing Garcetti twice, but never mentioning its holding, the court wrote: “As the
Supreme Court explained just last month, ‘public employees do not surrender all their First
Amendment rights by reason of their employment. . . . However ‘when a citizen enters government
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A. The Insufficiency of Whistleblower Statutes
A full analysis of federal and state whistleblower statutes is beyond the scope
of this Article; however, even a cursory investigation reveals that expecting
existing law to protect legitimate whistleblower claims is at best naïve, at worst,
facetious.
As Justice Souter noted in dissent, “the majority’s counsel to rest easy fails
on its own terms.”146 After citing a series of cases in which whistleblower law
afforded no protection, he added, “[m]ost significantly, federal employees have
been held to be unprotected for statements made in connection with normal
employment duties, the very speech that the majority says will be covered . . .
.”147
The gaps in federal law are matched by gaps in state law; at oral argument,
counsel for Ceballos described the state of whistleblower laws as “a complete hitor-miss situation across the country.”148 For example, Iowa’s whistleblower
statute creates a private cause of action when a government employee is
discharged in reprisal for disclosing “information [that] evidences a violation of
law or rule, mismanagement, a gross abuse of funds, an abuse of authority, or a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety . . . .”149 In Indiana, no
private right of action exists at all; although the statute provides that “a public
employer may not terminate an employee for reporting in writing a violation of
law or misuse of public resources,” the employee’s remedy is limited to
“appealing any disciplinary action.”150 Thus, when an Indiana employee was
fired for “reporting in writing a violation of law or misuse of public resources,”
and filed constitutional and state claims, the claims made under the state
whistleblower statute, far from being the most protective of the employee, were
instead the ones that were dismissed first.151 It was only the plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim that survived.152 New York’s statute, Labor Law Section 740,
is similarly unavailing. It has been called “probably the most restrictive and
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arcane” of state whistleblower laws.153 The law has been found not to cover
employees “opposing Medicare billing improprieties,” “fraudulent billing
practices,” “fiscal improprieties,” “disclosure of medical records,” or “fraudulent
banking activities,” as none of these activities “involve immediate threat to
public health and safety.”154 The state’s Civil Service Law, which covers public
employee whistleblowing, is slightly less restrictive but protects only internal,
and never public, disclosures.155
B. Reporting Misconduct to the Press Or to External Authorities: A
Catch-22
It has been observed that “[c]ommunications with the news media
concerning allegations of misconduct by public officials or employees are among
the most jealously guarded forms of free speech.”156 The Garcetti majority took
care to note, “[e]mployees who make public statements outside the course of
performing their official duties retain some possibility of First Amendment
protection because that is the kind of activity engaged in by citizens who “do not
work for the government. The same goes for writing a letter to a local
newspaper.”157
Other courts have taken pains to note that even when First Amendment rights
are curtailed within the public workplace, the freedom to contact the press is
unquestioned.158 But this freedom is an illusory one. Professor Jack Balkin
summed up the realities facing a would-be whistleblower after Garcetti thus:
[E]mployees will have incentives not to use such
procedures but to speak only in public if they
want First Amendment protections (note that if
they speak both privately and publicly, they can
153
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be fired for their private speech). However, if
they speak only publicly, they essentially forfeit
their ability to stay in their jobs, first because
they become pariahs, and second, because they
have refused to use the employer's internal
mechanisms for complaint (mechanisms which,
if they used them, would eliminate their First
Amendment rights). In short, whatever they do,
they are pretty much screwed.159
Counsel for the defendant acknowledged this Catch-22 when asked at oral
arguments about how an employee who goes public with allegations of
misconduct fares under the First Amendment160:
“[I]n some respects, if you're talking about jobrequired speech that you are -- part of those
duties, and the function, is to keep it internally
until at least there's some decision by the
supervisor, and, rather than do that, you send it
to the press or leak that information out, I think a
governmental disruption in efficiency can be
presumed there. So, I don't think it's as -- I don't
think it's as clear that that -- that Mr. Ceballos
would have ultimately prevailed under the
[Pickering] balancing. I mean, if he had taken
the [interrupted] . . . the speech externally, I
think there -- that he ultimately would have lost,
as well . . . .”161
As plaintiff’s counsel bluntly put it: “It’s a trap.”162
159
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Reporting problems internally first also means it would be impossible for the
employee subsequently to give the information to an external source, whether the
press or a government official, and remain anonymous. Under Garcetti, the safest
avenue—still risky and not especially efficient—may well be “to speak
anonymously or leak information to reporters and hope that the reporters don't
have to reveal their sources.”163 This is an odd incentive being created by a
decision—Garcetti—premised on the importance of smooth workplace
functioning and employee loyalty.
There are also many circumstances where an anonymous tip is simply
insufficient to expose wrongdoing. Popular Deep Throat-inspired understandings
of how the media work notwithstanding, there are many circumstances in which
taking a story public either requires identifying a source or makes the source’s
identity easy to determine.164
IV. Revisiting Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti with a Focus on Public
Interest
Connick has been criticized for dragging Pickering into a quagmire by
drawing unworkable distinctions between employee speech and citizen speech.165
163
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Yet that much-criticized distinction was retained, and made even more pivotal, in
Garcetti.
Following the path paved in Connick and forgoing the less-traveled-by
Givhan,166 the Garcetti majority is content to draw a line that will have the effect
of shutting out some employees who expose government wrongdoing before any
Pickering balancing analysis can be undertaken. This in spite of the fact that the
distinction between employee speech and citizen speech, always flimsy, is at its
weakest where a person is criticizing government corruption, and in spite of the
fact that such employees are often uniquely positioned to share information of
great public interest. The Court’s statement that such employees retain “some
possibility” of First Amendment protection when they pursue external channels
only emphasizes how little assurance there is of doing so. As Jack Balkin has
pointed out, “[T]he effect of the Court's decision is to create very strong
incentives against whistleblowing of any kind.”167
Justice Souter would have opted for tweaking the Pickering/Connick test in a
different way that would have accomplished the majority’s goal of weeding out
claims not worthy of judicial resources168 while retaining protection for the most
valuable speech.169
[T]he extent of the government’s legitimate
authority over subjects of speech required by a
public job can be recognized in advance by
setting in effect a minimum heft for comments
with any claim to outweigh it. Thus, the risks to
the government are great enough for us to hold
from the outset that an employee commenting on
subjects in the course of duties should not
166
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prevail on balance unless he speaks on a matter
of unusual importance and satisfies high
standards of responsibility in the way he does it.
. . . [I]t is fair to say that only comment on
official dishonest, deliberately unconstitutional
action, other serious wrongdoing, or threats to
health and safety can weigh out in an
employee’s favor.170
This approach avoids creating perverse incentives to take complaints public
before giving supervisors a chance to rectify problems. It raises the bar for First
Amendment retaliation claims rather than shutting the door on them.
The wisdom of the Souter approach is illustrated by a claim such as Keith
Batt’s. Batt is the Oakland Police Department rookie who observed ruthless and
pervasive criminal behavior, including the beating of citizens, by his fellow
police officers—even by his supervisor.171 It is absurd for a claim regarding a
matter of such high public import to have to step over an obstacle as arbitrary as
the one created in Garcetti172 to reach the Pickering test. As Ceballos’s counsel
said at oral argument in response to a suggestion that employers “would not be
hostile” to receiving information about misconduct: “Unfortunately, there’s too
much evidence, there’s too much water under the bridge that shows that public
employees who deliver bad news, and are the unwelcome messenger, do face
retaliation in their workplaces.”173
CONCLUSION
At first blush, Garcetti looked like it had the potential to eviscerate First
Amendment protections for the speech of public employees,174 but the bigger
picture indicates that the per se ruling is neither as airtight as its fans hope nor as
devastating as its foes fear. There is a subset of employees whose claims can now
170
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be more easily dismissed by a court that wishes to do so—and the decision may
well furnish convenient grounds for courts to toss cases from employees even
outside that subset. If the first published post-Garcetti cases are any indication,
however, courts are finding it possible to read Garcetti in ways that allow
plaintiffs with First Amendment claims to survive summary judgment even when
the speech they assert is protected was job-related. Garcetti may ultimately have
affected far fewer claims than has been hoped or feared.
Nevertheless, there is reason to be concerned that Garcetti has cut off
avenues for internal and external disclosure of government misconduct by
eliminating First Amendment protection. There is also reason for concern that
neither existing law nor the option of complaining publicly is an adequate
substitute for constitutional protection. The loss of protection of valuable speech
is not even likely to be offset by expedited disposition of cases or a
corresponding drop in case filings because the threshold question requires
determining what constitutes an employee’s “official duties” and is itself subject
to litigation, as post-Garcetti cases illustrate.
A better adjustment of Pickering and Connick would be one that, as Justice
Souter recommends, raises the bar for employee claims but leaves the door open
for constitutional protection of particularly valuable kinds of speech alerting the
public to government wrongdoing.
That yet another major First Amendment case has been decided by a single
vote lends credence to Professor Rodric Schoen’s observation that “reasonable
minds will differ on the ‘proper’ resolution of these cases.”175 Years before the
Court revisited the issue, Schoen wrote, “[G]iven the sharp divisions in Connick
and Rankin [both 5-4 decisions], perhaps the Justices . . . have decided that there
is nothing more to be said on public employee free speech cases,” and added
somewhat presciently, “or at least nothing to be added that would simplify
resolution of these cases in the lower courts.”176
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